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ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S FLORIDA POLICY
by GILBERT  L. L YCAN *
LEXANDER HAMILTON had a greater interest in Florida and
spoke of it more often than any other prominent American
of his period. While still living in the West Indies, he worked
for Beckman and Cruger at Christiansed, and during a part
of that time he was in charge of their commercial activities.1
Whenever he looked at a map of North America, which he often
did in the course of his activities, he saw first of all the penin-
sula of Florida pointing out toward his homeland. Throughout
his life Hamilton was aware of the importance of Florida in
the future of the United States.
Arriving in New York in 1772, to continue his education,
he soon became embroiled in the rising conflict between the
colonies and England. The agitation was not entirely new to
him, for the Stamp Act of 1765 had been stoutly resisted in the
West Indies, and his patron, Dr. Hugh Knox, was a vocal
opponent of the act. When Dr. Myles Cooper, president of
King’s College, where Hamilton was enrolled as a student, pub-
lished an article signed “A Westchester Farmer,” condemning
and ridiculing the actions of the First Continental Congress,
Hamilton replied by publishing “The Farmer Refuted” and
“The Full Vindication of Congress.“2 Florida was mentioned by
both correspondents. Cooper held that the action to cut off
trade with Britain and the West Indies would be ineffective be-
cause the needs of the islands could be supplied through im-
ports from Nova Scotia, Canada, and Florida. Hamilton, with
his clearer knowledge of the West Indies economy and with
some information on Florida, pointed out that Cooper’s sug-
* Mr. Lycan is professor of history, Stetson University.
1. The few facts known about Hamilton’s parentage and childhood are
given by Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton, 2 vols. (New York,
1962), I, l-36.
2. Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 12 vols.
(New York, 1904), I, 3-177.
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gestion was impractical. He then ventured onto less firm ground
by expressing the hope that Florida would “erelong” join in the
opposition to Britain. Apparently Hamilton’s knowledge of the
political situation in Florida at that time was limited. What
could Florida do in the controversy? The Florida “land monopo-
lizers,“3 were recent arrivals who were so dependent on British
favors and assistance that they were not likely to come out in
opposition. Many settlers, such as those who made up the
Turnbull settlement at New Smyrna, had bitter complaints
against their landlords; but they eagerly joined the armed
forces of Britain when given a chance.4 Soon after the Revolu-
tion began, disaffected loyalists began trekking into East and
West Florida.
Hamilton’s Florida policy of later years was marked by his
attitude toward Spain, and this was shaped by the changing con-
ditions through the years. As the Revolution approached,
Hamilton felt sure France and Spain, because of their oppo-
sition to England, would support America. To think otherwise,
he said, would be to assume that those nations were inattentive
to their interests and forgetful of their customary imperialistic
ambitions.5 When these two countries failed to take quick action,
Hamilton became disgusted with their reluctance to enter the
conflict. He expressed only a sense of disappointment toward
France, for he appreciated even her early surreptitious assist-
ance, but he was acrimonious in his references to Spain.6
Toward the close of the war, Hamilton represented New
York in the Continental Congress, and from that vantage point,
he helped prepare the instructions being sent to the peace
emissaries in Paris. He would not object to Spanish reacquisition
of the Floridas if it were agreed that the northern border of
those provinces were drawn at the thirty-first parallel, and if
Spain recognized America’s right of free navigation on the Mis-
sissippi with a free port of deposit. He criticized the negotiators
for agreeing at one time for a more northerly boundary for
Florida if Britain should hold that territory: he insisted that
3. Charlton W. Tebeau and Ruby Leach Carson, Florida from Indian
Trail to Space Age, 3 vols. (Delray Beach, 1965), I, 70.
4. Ibid., I, 74-75.
5. “The Farmer Refuted,” in Lodge, The ‘Works of Alexander Hamilton,
I, 164.
6. Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 20, 1781, in ibid., III, 359.
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the United States should not show favoritism for the common
enemy.7
During the mid-1780s, Hamilton had little to say about
Florida. The fiery liberator of Spanish America, Francisco de
Miranda, spent time with Hamilton in 1784 laying plans for a
future revolution to free all Spain’s and Portugal’s American
dominions, and this is reflected in Hamilton’s Florida policy
during the crucial years 1798-1799.8 From Miranda he also ac-
quired a deeper antipathy for the Spanish ways of governing.
Hamilton was quite active in his Florida policy while serving
out a second term in Congress in 1787. He was a member of the
committee concerned with foreign affairs. All its resolutions are
in his handwriting, though it is not assumed that he alone
determined the contents in every case. Congress protested to
Spain because slaves from the United States were given asylum
in the Floridas, and it urged a mutual policy of forcibly return-
ing slaves who crossed the border in either direction.9 Appar-
ently Hamilton supported this action, although he had pre-
viously expressed intense opposition to slavery. He must have
assumed that no action harmful to blacks would follow and
that the complaint would publicize Spain’s weakness and Ameri-
ca’s interest in the Floridas. In accordance with a resolution of
Hamilton’s committee, the Congress also expressed the right
of American citizens to navigate freely the Mississippi.10
In the Nootka Sound controversy of 1790, Spain and Great
Britain threatened to go to war with each other. This served as
an occasion for Washington and his advisors to take a long,
hard look at the nation’s foreign policy. ll  Both Hamilton
7. Francis Wharton, ed., Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the
United States, 6 vols. (Washington, 1889), VI, 338-40.
8. William Spence Robertson, “Francisco de Miranda and the Revolution-
izing of Spanish America,” American History Association, Annual Report
for 1907 (1909), I, 195, 251. An indication of other distinguished
Americans with whom Miranda conferred may be gained by checking
his calling cards, social notes, etc., when he was in the United States.
See Vincente Davila, ed., Archivo del General Miranda, 15 vols. (Caracas,
1929-1938), V, 244-79, XV, 73-79; Hamilton to Miranda, August 22,
1798 in Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, X, 316.
9.  Entries,  September 15, 16,  1788, in Worthington C. Ford, ed.,
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 vols. (Washington,
1904-1937), XXXIV, 527,534-35.
10. Committee report, Continental Congress, August 25, 1788, in ibid.,
XXXIV, 458-60.
11. Washington to Hamilton, October 10, 1790, in John C. Fitzgerald, ed.,
Writings of George Washington, 39 vols. (Washington, 1931-1944),
XXXI,132.
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and Jefferson advised the President to move swiftly to obtain
every possible diplomatic advantage from the situation.12 They
thought it might be possible to induce the British to relinquish
the Northwest posts and the area she was holding south of the
Great Lakes, and Spain to cede her gulf territory as the price
for American neutrality. If this failed, both considered seriously
the possibilities of supporting either side if war came. Hamilton
knew that the Floridas and Louisiana would have to be acquired
if the United States was to continue as a united country. He
urged the President to increase the country’s military strength.
Jefferson said nothing about military preparations though his
attitude seemed more hostile, and he seemed to dread war less
than Hamilton.
Hamilton saw that it might be harmful if Britain came into
possession of the territories contiguous to the United States.
Yet he detested Spanish intrigues in the West and her unwill-
ingness to allow free navigation on the Mississippi. He held
that Spain’s aid during the Revolution was so meager and so
reluctantly given that it placed the United States under no
obligation. War with Spain, he told Washington, should not be
a very serious undertaking, and it might become unavoidable
if she persistently refused to relax her hold on the Floridas.
Jefferson instructed William Carmichael, America’s chargé d’-
affairs in Madrid, to notify the Spanish minister that there
would be no negotiation unless American citizens were granted
full navigation rights on the Mississippi. Spain’s arguments as to
their right to a Florida boundary north of the thirty-first degree
did not merit “the respect of an answer.” Carmichael was to
negotiate only concerning American rights in New Orleans and
a complete cession of the Floridas. It would be in Spain’s interest
to turn over the Floridas in exchange for an American guarantee
of Spain’s rights to all territory west of the Mississippi. This
would eliminate all points of friction between the countries
and would make the United States a friend. Then if the north-
12. Frederick Jackson Turner, “English Policy Toward America in 1790-
1791,” American Historical Review, VII (July 1902),  706-35,  VIII
(October 1902), 78-86; Hamilton’s detailed opinion, September 15, 1790,
is given by Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 313-42. For
all the opinions see Worthington C. Ford’s The United States and
Spain in 1790 (Brooklyn, 1890), passim.
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ern controversy should lead to war between Spain and Britain,
American neutrality would be “very partial” in Spain’s favor, or
the United States would enter the conflict “on the side of the
H[ouse] of Bourbon.” As Jefferson saw it, Spain, by giving up
Florida, that “narrow strip of barren, detached, and expensive
country . . . secures the rest of her territory, and makes an ally.“13
It was at this time that Jefferson announced that it would
not be to “our interest to cross the Mississippi for ages. And
[it] will never be our interest to remain united with those who
do.“14 He was serious in this, and was willing to pledge the
United States never to take any territory west of the Mississippi.
At no time in Hamilton’s life did he look with equanimity upon
the idea of accepting the Mississippi as the final westernmost
boundary of the United States.
The passing of the Nootha Sound controversy did not mean
that the country could take its eyes off Florida. Jefferson con-
tinued to press forward on the navigation problem, appealing
always to the lofty principles of justice. British officials spoke
often of the likelihood of war between the United States and
Spain, and their agent, George Beckwith, after frequent conver-
sations with Hamilton, reported to London in 1791 that the
United States would “break with [Spain] tomorrow, if their
condition admitted of it.“15 The British consul at Charleston, G.
Miller, advised his government against seizing the Floridas in
case of war with Spain. He described the Floridas as a barren
area, and East Florida, he thought, would especially be a “poor
acquisition to any power.“16 London accepted as accurate the
assumption that the United States would soon go to war to
obtain the coveted territory, and George Hammond, Britain’s
minister to the United States, was instructed in 1791 to learn
all he could of America’s policy toward Spain. He was informed
that Britain would not try to keep America from getting the
Florida territory.17
13. Jefferson to William Carmichael, August 2, 1790, in A.A. Liscomb and
A.E. Bergh, eds., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 vols. (Wash-
ington, 1903-1904), VII, 71-72.
14. Jefferson to Carmichael, August 22, 1790, in ibid., XVII, 306.
15. March 3, 1791, Public Record 0ffice, Foreign Office, 4. London, Library
of Congress photostat.
16. G. Miller to the Duke of Leeds, September 3, 1790, in ibid.
17. Bernard Mayo, ed., Instructions to the British Ministers to the United
States, 1791-1812 (Washington, 1941), 16-7.
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The French Revolution had a major impact on American
foreign policy. Colonel W. S. Smith, John Adams’s son-in-law,
brought the startling news from Paris in 1792 of a plan to
liberate Spain’s American empire. The French, according to
Smith, would not object to the United States taking Florida
if in turn the Americans would cooperate with France.18 Jeffer-
son, falling in with the plan, began protesting more vocifer-
ously against Spanish encouragement of Indian attacks on white
frontiersmen.19 Spain, he claimed, was “so evidently picking a
quarrel with us, that we see a war absolutely inevitable with
her.“20 Jefferson was apparently pleased by the new turn of
European diplomacy. He promptly ordered the American repre-
sentatives at Madrid to forego making any agreements to guaran-
tee Spain’s territory west of the Mississippi. His previous offer
to guarantee Louisiana to Spain was based on the fear that Great
Britain might seize it. 21 He seemed totally undisturbed by the
thought of France taking over the same region together with
areas to the south.
The spirited French minister Genet then entered the picture.
With Britain in the war beginning in 1793, and with early
French military reverses, it was quite impossible for the revo-
lutionaries to dispatch an expeditionary force to America. Genet,
however, laid before Jefferson a grandiose plan for moving ahead
with the attack. With no ships, men, or money from his own
government, he would take the offensive against Florida, Louis-
iana, and perhaps also Canada, Mexico, and South America!
He planned to recruit settlers from the western frontier, “brave
Republicans” from South Carolina, and he hoped to receive aid
from the Indians.22 To finance this plan, he would turn to
the United States.23
18. “The Anas,” in Liscomb and Bergh, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, I,
334-35.
19. Jefferson to Carmichael and William Short, May 31, 1793, in ibid., I,
104.
20. Jefferson to James Monroe, June 28, 1793, in ibid., IX, 144. Italics are
in the original.
21. Ibid, IX, 55-56.
22. Genet to Jefferson, December 25, 1793, American State Papers, Foreign
Relations, I, 311; John H. Wolfe, Jeffersonian Democracy in South
Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1940), 73-74.
23. Genet’s official instructions are given in Frederick Jackson Turner,
Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797,
American Historical Association, Annual Report for 1903 (1904), II,
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Alexander Hamilton stopped the show. In spite of his eager-
ness to acquire Florida, he opposed this kind of a deal with
France. Nor would he countenance cooperation with the French
revolutionaries, whom he had come to detest.24 Jefferson inter-
ceded on Genet’s behalf, but Hamilton remained adamant, and
President Washington supported him.25
Genet moved ahead with his plans. Jefferson warned him
against recruiting Americans on United States soil, but indicated
that he did not care what kind of insurrections were stirred up
in Louisisana. This was an open invitation to Genet to continue
with his efforts.26 The French minister became acquainted with
a great many Americans, and in the summer of 1793 it seemed
quite possible that he would be able to seize Louisiana and
Florida. He expected the American privateersmen whom he had
commissioned to cooperate with attacking land forces from
Georgia. The latter would be commanded by Samuel Hammond
of George with a commission of colonel “In Command of the
Revolutionary Legion of the Floridas.“27
It was all to no avail. Money was essential, and Hamilton
held the purse strings. He was more positive than Jefferson in
warning against recruitment of Americans by Genet.28 But he
had no time to gloat over his victory. Even while he was taking
the wily Genet in hand, a furor arose because of British molesta-
tion of American neutral commerce. Hamilton was aghast at
the aggressive measures of Britain, and he was quick to assert
that they would not be tolerated. He urged his own govern-
ment to prepare for war, while at the same time he also began
searching for possibilities of a peaceful solution. War with
Britain, Hamilton knew, would mean also war with Spain. In
one of his “Americanus” essays, he warned that the British
operating from Canada and the Spanish in Florida could stir
up “a general Indian war” that “would not fail to spread deso-
24. Hamilton to Washington, November 19, 1792, in Lodge, The Works of
Alexander Hamilton, IV, 363-65.
25. Jefferson to Washington, June 6, 1793, in Liscomb and Bergh, Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 114-17.
26. Jefferson’s memo concerning a conference with Genet, July 5, 1793,
“The Anas,” ibid., I, 361-62.
27. Frederick Jackson Turner. “The Policy of France Toward the Miss-
issippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams,” American
Historical Review, X (January 1905), 261.
28. Hamilton to Washington, May 15, 1793, in Lodge, The Works of
Alexander Hamilton, IV, 410-12.
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lation throughout our frontier.“29 It would not be easy for the
United States to seize Florida, he said, so long as the British
navy was available to defend these provinces. His advice to the
nation was, emphatically, prepare for war but work for peace.
It was Hamilton, more than any other person, who convinced
Washington to send John Jay to London to work out an arrange-
ment with Britain, and Hamilton wrote Jay’s essential instruc-
tions. According to one authority, Jay’s treaty might well be
called “Hamilton’s Treaty.“30 Upon his insistence, the treaty
reiterated the mutual guarantee of free navigation on the
Mississippi.31 British navigation on the Mississippi would not
be injurious to the United States, but by mentioning it in the
treaty he felt that it might somehow weaken Spain’s position.32
Spain was alarmed over the Anglo-American negotiations.
Consequently, Thomas Pinckney in 1795 scored a diplomatic
triumph in negotiating a treaty in which Spain conceded Ameri-
ca’s right of navigation on the Mississippi with New Orleans
as a port of deposit. Spain also accepted the claim of the United
States as to the northern border of Florida.33 These points,
Hamilton wrote, were “advantages of real magnitude and im-
portance” and made him “very happy.“34
The Florida question was, nevertheless, far from being set-
tled. Article IV of Pinckney’s treaty stated that navigation in the
Mississippi should be free only to Spain’s subjects and “the
citizens of the United States.” Manual de Godoy, the Spanish
minister, hoped the use of the word “only” would associate the
United States with Spain in excluding Britain from the Missis-
sippi. This was not the American intention, as was made clear
29. ‘Americanus,” No. 2, February 8, 1794, in ibid., V, 87.
30. Samuel F. Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy
(New York, 1923), 271.
31. For a full text of the treaty, see Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other
International Acts of the United States, 1776-1883, 8 vols. (Washington,
1931-1948), II, 245-74.
32. Washington asked for Hamilton’s written opinion on all parts of the
treaty. Hamilton went diligently to the heart of the matter in a long
letter to the President, July 9, 1795, in Lodge, The Works of Alexander
Hamilton, V, 138-81.
33. For a thorough account of the negotiations, see Samuel F. Bemis,
Pinckney’s Treaty, America’s Advantage from Europe’s Distress (New
Haven, 1960), passim.
34. Hamilton’s “The Public Conduct and character of John Adams,”
in Lodge, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, VII, 318; Hamilton
to Rufus King, May 4, 1796, in ibid., X, 163. For the text of Pinckney’s
treaty, see Miller, Treaties and other International Acts, II, 318-38.
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by the Anglo-American agreement in 1796.35 This so disap-
pointed Godoy that he ordered his agents in the Floridas to
suspend execution of Pinckney’s treaty. Navigation on the Mis-
sissippi was allowed to continue, but the Spaniards, through non-
cooperation and by stirring up Indian hostility toward the
American surveying party, stopped the process of marking the
new northern boundary of Florida. This brought forth a re-
newed chorus of American complaints regarding Spanish perfidy,
procrastination, and ill will.36 And now a new and disturbing
element entered American considerations— the belief that Spain
was at the point of ceding Louisiana and Florida to the French.
In 1795, the Peace of Basle was negotiated with France, which
looked toward a renewal of the old alliance between the two
countries.37 It was widely assumed in Europe and America that
this would render Spain dependent upon France. How, other-
wise, could she maintain her empire against a vengeful England?
During the winter of 1796-1797 there were reports from
many quarters that France had taken possession of Florida or
was at the point of doing so. This was believed by some Ameri-
can officials in Europe, including John Quincy Adams, by Bri-
tish officials in London and America, and by most of the leading
Federalists in the United States.38 Some Republican leaders in
the United States vehemently denied that America’s Revolu-
tionary War ally would be so rude as to seize these strategic
territories. James Monroe, for instance, wrote from Paris that
the French foreign office had assured him it was not interested
in the gulf regions except possibly to keep Britain out of
the area.39
35. Ibid., II, 346-47.
36. Arthur P. Whitaker, “The Retrocession of Louisiana in Spanish Policy,”
American Historical Review, XXXIX (April 1934), 460-62.
37. E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy (Norman, 1934), 83.
38. William Barry Grove (North Carolina), to James Hogg, June 24, De-
cember 18, 1797, in Henry Gilbert Wagstaff, ed., “Letters of William
Barry Grove,” James Sprunt Historical Publications, Vol. IX, 2, 62, 65;
Fisher Ames to Hamilton, January 26, 1797, in John C. Hamilton, ed.,
The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York, 1850-1851), VI,
200; Oliver Wolcott to John Adams, April 25, 1797, in George Gibbs,
ed., Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams,
2 vols. (New York, 1846), I, 513.
39. Monroe to Short,  May 20, 1795; Monroe to Timothy Pickering,
September 10, 1796, in S.M. Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Mon-
roe, 7 vols. (New York, 1889-1903), II, 289-90, III, 62.
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What did the French really think, and what policy were they
actually pursuing? The French minister to the United States, the
Comte de Moustier, recommended in 1789 the reacquisition of
Louisiana, east and west of the Mississippi, which in his view
included Florida.40 In 1796 General Victor Collot, former
governor of Guadeloupe, made a ten month’s survey of the
Ohio and Mississippi regions, and afterwards he also advised
his government to obtain the territory all the way eastward
to the Allegheny Mountains and to fortify the passes against the
United States.41 By 1796 the French government had definitely
adopted this as a national goal. For Tallyrand it was a personal
ambition as well as a national goal to seize Spain’s gulf terri-
tories and to take the Ohio valley and everything up to the
Alleghenies in order to have a firm checkrein on the United
States.42 He could not move immediately, for he had to find a
way around the British navy.
France keenly resented Jay’s treaty, looking upon it as a
violation of the traditional France-American alliance.43 Her
naval forces were ordered to treat American commerce harshly.44
By 1797 this action had become so offensive that it had destroyed
the alliance, and the two nations were moving toward war with
each other. In 1798 Congress, in the face of stout Republican op-
position, enacted measures that led to what has been called a
“limited war.” There was some action at sea; American seamen
defeated the French vessels that had escaped the British navy.45
Hamilton strongly supported the resistance measures, and
he charged that France was aiming at taking over Florida and
Louisiana in order to cripple American independence. Yet he
opposed actual war with France until every reasonable effort
for peaceful accommodation had been made.46 In doing this







E. Wilson Lyon, “Moustier’s Memoir of Louisiana,” Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XXII (September 1935), 251-66.
Durand Echeverria, transl., “Genera1 Collot’s Plan for a Reconnais-
sance of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys, 1796,” William and Mary
Quarterly, 3rd Series, IX (October 1952), 513-16.
Turner, “The Policy of France Toward the Mississippi Valley,” 249.
Alphonse Bertrand, “Les Etats-Unis et la Révolution Française,” Revue
des Deux Mondes, 5th Series, XXXIII (May 15, 1906), 427.
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 745.
Gardner W. Allen, Our Naval War with France (Boston, 1909), passim.
Hamilton to Washington, November 19, 1796, in Lodge, The Works of
Alexander Hamilton, X, 208-09.
43.
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saw both national and party advantages in a French war.47 In
this situation Hamilton again rose above party considerations.
Following the XYZ Affair, when Talleyrand refused to talk
peace with the American commissioners but asked for bribes
and made threats, it appeared obvious to most Americans, in-
cluding Hamilton, that war was no longer avoidable. Congress
voted funds to raise an army, and President Adams asked Wash-
ington to come out of retirement to head this force. Washington
successfully insisted that Hamilton be made second in command,
and that as inspector-general, Hamilton be given the responsi-
bility for organizing the army. 48 Hamilton would fight for no
small stakes. Fearing a French invasion through Spain’s terri-
tories on the gulf, he decided to seize those areas for the United
States. While the British navy was holding the Atlantic against
the French and Spaniards, Hamilton saw his chance to move
against Louisiana and Florida.49 Britain practically begged for
an alliance with the United States,50 but Hamilton would not
agree to it. From first to last, he positively turned his back on
a British alliance, but he was willing to accept the cooperation
of the British naval units in the gulf.51 Britain indicated readi-
ness to make this a cooperative venture without insisting on an
alliance.52
In the meantime, Hamilton was secretly building and equip-
ping an army on the Ohio for a descent upon New Orleans.53
For strategic reasons, he would strike New Orleans first, though
he indicated that Florida was of greater value. This was prob-
ably because Florida was so frequently on his mind. Likely
also he had often contemplated the ease and certainty of the
47. Hamilton to Wolcott, November 22, 1796, in ibid., 209-14; Hamilton to
48.
King December 16, 1796, in ibid., 215-17.
Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton, II, 427-53.
49. Hamilton to General James Gunn, December 22, 1798, in Lodge, The
Works of Alexander Hamilton VII, 46; Hamilton to Harrison Gray
Otis, January 26, 1799, in ibid., X. 338-39.
50. Grenville to Liston, December 8, 1798, in Mayo, Instructions to British
Ministers, 165.
51. Hamilton to Pickering, March 27, 1798, in Lodge, The Works of
Alexander Hamilton, X, 280.
52. Grenville to Liston, June 8, December 8, 1798, in Mayo, Instructions to
British Ministers, 165.
53. Hamilton to General James Wilkinson, April 15, 1799, in Lodge, The
Works of Alexander Hamilton VII, 75-76.
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acquisition of Louisiana once Florida was safely in American
hands.
Hamilton made General James Wilkinson his next in com-
mand in the West even though it was widely rumored that the
general was a traitor, or at least had been receiving money from
Spanish authorities for carrying out treasonable activities. Hamil-
ton and Adams refused to believe the accusations.54 Washington
at first hesitated, then went along with Hamilton in the mat-
ter.55 James McHenry, secretary of war, was convinced that
Wilkinson was a traitor, and he begged Hamilton to have
nothing to do with him.56
Wilkinson was promoted to the rank of major general, and
Hamilton took him fully into his confidence. Subsequent his-
torical research has proved that Wilkinson had been working
with the Spaniards for pay, although he cut off his relations
with them at this time and seemed to work loyally to help
Hamilton carry out the expedition.57 Together they prepared
for an attack on New Orleans or Pensacola. Hamilton asked
Wilkinson to gather as much information as possible concern-
ing “western inhabitants,” the Indians and Spaniards, and the
best manner for “attacking the two Floridas.”58
Hamilton was apprehensive that Britain might be defeated
in her war with France or might leave the conflict through sheer
wearinesss.59 In that case, a French invasion would be an im-
mediate danger. It was reported in Congress that France already
had an army of 5,000 men, mostly Negroes, in the West Indies,








Hamilton to Adams, September 7, 1799, in James Wilkinson, Memoirs
of My Own Times, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1816), II, 158; Adams to
Wilkinson, February 4, 1798, in Charles Francis Adams, ed., The Works
of John Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1850-1856), VIII, 563-64.
Washington to Hamilton; June 25, 1799, in Fitzgerald, Writings of
George Washington, XXXVIX, 246.
James McHenry to Hamilton, June 27, 1799, in Hamilton, Works of
Alexander Hamilton, V, 283.
James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior (New York, 1938), 166.
Hamilton to Wilkinson, April 15, 1799, in Lodge, The Works of
Alexander Hamilton, VII, 75-76.
Hamilton’s essay, “The Strand,” No. VI, April 19, 1798, in ibid., VI,
303; William B. Giles (Virginia), March 29, 1798, Annals of Congress,
1789-1824, 42 vols. (Washington, 1834-1856), VIII, 1352.
Robert Goodloe Harper (South Carolina), April 24, 1798, ibid., VIII,
1530-31.
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that any French invasion would come in the South, most likely
through New Orleans or Florida.61
Hamilton’s plan of action was kept so well under wraps that
some aspects of it are not clear even now to the historian.
Wilkinson recommended a military buildup at Loftus Heights
on the Mississippi from which to “carry a coup-de-main against
the capital below.“62 Washington and Hamilton thought this
point was too close to the Spaniards and would alert them pre-
maturely to the movement being planned.63 It was decided to
bring the forces together far up on the Ohio, from which point,
Washington said, it would be possible to “descend the river like
lightning” and hit the enemy unawares.64 The project worked
out by Hamilton and Wilkinson called for seventy-five boats,
each to carry forty men with “baggage and stores.“65 Thus
Hamilton proposed to move out on the high waters in the
spring of 1800 with an army of 3,000 men to attack the Span-
iards at St. Louis and New Orleans. From New Orleans it
would sweep eastward to enfold Florida with the assistance of
the British navy which was being offered on almost any terms
the Americans might desire.
Apparently much of Hamilton’s lifetime ambition was about
to be fulfilled. In 1790 he had perceived that the permanence
of the national union required the acquisition of Florida. This
acquisition, it seemed, was about to be made. In 1774 he had
hoped Florida would “erelong” join in American resistance to
Britain. Was the union about to occur?
The climax was in the plan and the preparation— not in
the world of actual events. President Adams supported the navy
but starved the army. Vice-President Jefferson saw, neverthe-
less, that the only way to stop Hamilton was to prevent the French
attacks on American commerce. This he thought he could do
by informing the French government of Hamilton’s and Wash-
ington’s plans. The generals had tried desperately to keep their
61. Washington to Adams, July 4, 1798; Washington to Pickering, October
18, 1798; Washington to McHenry, July 11, 1789, in Fitzgerald, Writings
of George Washington, XXXVI, 313, 324, 497.
62. Wilkerson to Hamilton, April 15, 1799, Alexander Hamilton Papers,
Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, Vol. 39.
63. Hamilton to Washington, September 9, 1799, in Lodge, The Works of
Alexander Hamilton, VII, 124.
64. Washington to Hamilton, September 15, 1799, in Fitzgerald, Writings of
George Washington, XXXVII, 364.
65. Hamilton to McHenry, October 29, 1799, Hamilton Papers, Vol. 58.
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secret, even by camouflaging appropriation bills, but they
could not keep their plans hidden from Jefferson. Learning
that Victor duPont, whom President Adams had refused to
receive as a consul from France, was returning to Europe, Jef-
ferson asked him to inform Talleyrand that his country’s at-
tacks on American commerce were ruining the pro-French
Republican Party and that Hamilton was preparing to march
on New Orleans.66 Talleyrand immediately saw that he must
win the good will of the United States or see his own Louis-
iana-Florida dream vanish,67 and he begged Adams for a re-
newal of peace negotiations.
Adams and many of his friends thought there was but a
slight chance that France would grant acceptable terms, and
it was humiliating to the President to send yet another peace
commission to France after the repeated rebuffs he had met.
But Adams had come to dislike Hamilton, and he was willing
to go to almost any lengths to keep him from vaulting to the
high level of esteem that would surely follow a gulf victory.
Adams named William R. Davie, Oliver Ellsworth, and Wil-
liam Vans Murray as his new peace emissaries.68 Hamilton’s
activities were immediately halted. Without funds he could
not build the boats or the fortifications thought necessary,
and the Mississippi question fell into other hands.69
Peace with France the following year opened the way for
Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase in 1803.70 Numerous Federalist
leaders, influenced by party considerations or sectionalism, op-
posed the purchase. Timothy Pickering protested against “the
purchase of an immense territory which we did not want, and
at such a price.“71 Party preference did not go that far with
Hamilton. “It is a noble bargain,” he affirmed, and he used
66. Whitaker, “The Retrocession of Louisiana in Spanish Policy,” 467; E.
Wilson Lyon, “The Directory and the United States,” American Histori-
cal Review, XLIII (April 1938), 529; J.A. James, “Louisiana as a Factor
in American Diplomacy, 1795-1800,” Mississippi Valley Historical Re-
view, I (June 1914), 54.
67. Lyon, “The Directory and the United States,” 518.
68. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 239-40; Charles Francis
Adams, ed., Life of John Adams, I, 347-547, in Writings of John Adams.
69. Miller, Treaties and other International Acts, II, 457-79.
70. Ibid., 498-505.
71. Pickering to Caleb Strong, November 22, 1803, Timothy Pickering
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts.
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his influence energetically to obtain ratification of the treaty.72
Indeed this did not fulfill Hamilton’s dream concerning
Florida, but it was an important step in that direction. Be-
fore his life ended the following year, he must have reflected
often on how he had helped to guide the nation through his
publications, his correspondence, his congressional resolutions,
and his counsel, toward the eventual acquisition of that part
of North America that lay closest to his boyhood home, the
peninsula of Florida.
72. Hamilton’s views on the treaty were expressed in editorials in the
New York Evening Post, see especially the issue, July 5, 1803.
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